房地产业对金融机构的系统性风险溢出效应研究——基于行业与企业综合视角的实证分析

房地产业与金融业具有强烈的共生性，当房地产业陷入困境时，是否会迅速扩散到与其关联的各类金融机构，蔓延并危及整个金融系统，出现房地产业对金融机构的"系统性风险溢出"?文章综合运用房地产行业指数与房地产企业数据，基于CoVaR模型和分位数回归方法，测算了我国房地产业对各类金融机构的系统性风险溢出强度，分析了其时变趋势和影响因素。实证结果表明，我国房地产业对金融机构存在较为显著的系统性风险溢出效应，在时间维度上存在周期性；房地产业对股份制与城商行的风险溢出强度最大，其次是保险机构和信托，最小的是国有银行；房地产企业的自身风险、规模和负债水平对风险溢出强度具有显著影响。据此，文章对金融监管部门、金融机构与房地产行业提出了相应的政策建议。     

基于边际效应的银行个体系统性风险贡献测度研究

本文使用系统性风险β值法度量我国上市银行的系统性风险以及上市银行对系统性风险的贡献度。研究结果表明,单个机构对系统性风险的贡献不仅取决于系统性风险β值,还受到其个体风险值的影响。总体而言,国有大型商业银行的系统性风险β值高于中小股份制商业银行,对系统性风险的边际贡献和影响也较大。但中小股份制商业银行抵御风险的能力相对较弱,尽管β值较小,一旦个体风险值急剧增加,其对系统性风险的影响也可能超过国有大型商业银行。因此,系统性风险的防范既要关注那些系统性风险β值大的银行,也要关注个体风险值可能出现剧烈波动的中小银行。     

Forecasting systemic impact in financial networks

We propose a methodology for forecasting the systemic impact of financial institutions in interconnected systems. Utilizing a five-year sample including the 2008/9 financial crisis, we demonstrate how the approach can be used for the timely systemic risk monitoring of large European banks and insurance companies. We predict firms’ systemic relevance as the marginal impact of individual downside risks on systemic distress. So-called systemic risk betas account for a company’s position within the network of financial interdependencies, in addition to its balance sheet characteristics and its exposure to general market conditions. Relying only on publicly available daily market data, we determine time-varying systemic risk networks, and forecast the systemic relevance on a quarterly basis. Our empirical findings reveal time-varying risk channels and firms’ specific roles as risk transmitters and/or risk recipients.     

监测系统性金融风险——中国金融市场压力指数构建和状态识别

对系统性金融风险进行识别和评估,日益成为各国中央银行的核心关切。囿于数据频率,基于金融机构经营稳健性评估的金融系统性风险监测存在一定的滞后性,不利于中央银行及时进行风险应对,利用金融市场交易数据进行风险监测可极大程度克服滞后性问题。本文根据中国金融市场特点,选取债券市场、股票市场、货币市场和外汇市场17个有代表性的指标,运用经验累积分布函数法分别构造了各子市场的压力指数,以各子市场之间时变的相关关系刻画系统性金融风险的跨市场传染特征,合成金融市场压力指数,并通过建立马尔可夫区制转换模型,对金融市场压力状态进行识别。金融市场压力指数能有效反映样本域内的压力事件,并兼具稳健性、能逐日监测等优点,为监测评估系统性金融风险、选择政策实施窗口和评估政策实施效果等提供了有力工具。     

Understanding the market reaction to shockwaves: Evidence from the failure of Lehman Brothers

The spectacular failure of the 150-year-old investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15th, 2008 was a major turning point in the global financial crisis that broke out in the summer of 2007. Through the use of stock market data and credit default swap (CDS) spreads, this paper examines investors’ reaction to Lehman's collapse in an attempt to identify a spillover effect on the surviving financial institutions. The empirical analysis indicates that (i) the collateral damage was limited to the largest financial firms; (ii) the institutions most affected were the surviving “non-bank” financial services firms; and (iii) the negative effect was correlated with the financial conditions of the surviving institutions. We also detect significant abnormal jumps in CDS spreads that we interpret as evidence of sudden upward revisions in the market assessment of future default probabilities assigned to the surviving financial firms.     

Good for one,bad for all: Determinants of individual versus systemic risk

We analyze a sample of large international banks in major advanced economies and examine the impact that bank-specific factors have on an institution's solvency risk and its contribution to systemic risk. We focus on the five categories that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has recently proposed as indicators of systemic importance. Our findings suggest that unstable funding is the main factor driving systemic risk. Furthermore, the combination of significant trading activities with global presence appears to exacerbate spillover risks to the global financial system. Interestingly, whereas trading activities contribute to the build-up of correlated or ‘wrong-way’ risk they help to mitigate individual solvency risk. Conversely, a decentralized approach to liquidity management seems to alleviate individual solvency risk but amplifies the transmission of financial distress across the financial system. This suggests that a macro-prudential approach to financial regulation should focus not only on scaling up micro-prudential measures but also on enabling the efficient transfer of risk between financial institutions.     

Modelling systemic price cojumps with Hawkes factor models

Instabilities in the price dynamics of a large number of financial assets are a clear sign of systemic events. By investigating portfolios of highly liquid stocks, we find that there are a large number of high-frequency cojumps. We show that the dynamics of these jumps is described neither by a multivariate Poisson nor by a multivariate Hawkes model. We introduce a Hawkes one-factor model which is able to capture simultaneously the time clustering of jumps and the high synchronization of jumps across assets.     

官商结盟的体制效应——以近代中国民营企业发展为例的分析

开放经济条件下,在一个相对集权的体制中,为规避潜在的风险,民营企业通常会采取"消极适应或积极适应"两种发展形式。"以牺牲企业对外部(技术、市场)变化适应性为代价换取产权安全"的消极适应型发展的直接后果是使得政府提升国家产业竞争力的努力受挫。与消极适应型发展模式不同,一些民营企业会选择积极适应型的发展模式,即通过寻求官方庇护的政治方式来确保创新收益安全,企业发展与滋生腐败之间极易发生联系。"‘腐败’成为企业发展‘润滑剂’"现象的出现,侵蚀了国家政治体制,加剧了政府和社会大众的不满,客观上加大了企业发展面临的潜在风险。体制"怪圈"的形成,既不利于国家竞争力的提升,又极可能引发政府统治的合法性危机。本文分析表明,只有将民营企业从坏体制"始作俑者"的角色中解放出来,才能破解体制怪圈。这需要从根本上改变民营企业"既是被需要的,同时又是被歧视的"尴尬处境。中国近代史上有关民营企业发展的案例为本文假说提供了丰富的实质性内容。     

A model of a systemic bank run

This paper provides a model of the view that the 2008 financial crisis is reminiscent of a bank run, focussing on six stylized key features. In particular, core financial institutions have invested their funds in asset-backed securities rather than committed to long-term projects: in distress, these can potentially be sold to a large pool of outside investors at steep discounts. I consider two different motives for outside investors and their interaction with banks trading asset-backed securities: uncertainty aversion versus adverse selection. I shall argue that the version with uncertainty averse investors is more consistent with the stylized facts than the adverse selection perspective: in the former, the crisis deepens, the larger the market share of distressed core banks, while a run becomes less likely instead as a result in the adverse selection version. Therefore, the outright purchase of troubled assets by the government at prices above current market prices may both alleviate the financial crises as well as provide tax payers with returns above those for safe securities.